W.V.O. Quine has famously objected that (1) properties are philosophically suspect because (2) there is no entity without identity and (3) the synonymy criterion for property identity won't do because there's no such concept as synonymy. (2) and (3) may or may not be right but do not prove (1). I reply that Leiniz's Law handles property identity, as it does for everything else, then respond to a variety of objections and confusions.

The theories Si1 and Ti1 are the analogues of Buss' relativized bounded arithmetic theories in the language where every term is bounded by a polynomial, and thus all definable functions grow linearly in length. For every i, a Σbi+1-formula TOPi, which expresses a form of the total ordering principle, is exhibited that is provable in Si+11 , but unprovable in Ti1. This is in contrast with the classical situation, where Si+12 is conservative over Ti2 w. r. t. Σbi+1-sentences. The independence (...) results are proved by translations into propositional logic, and using lower bounds for corresponding propositional proof systems. (shrink)

We define and study a new restricted consistency notion RCon ∗ for bounded arithmetic theories T 2 j . It is the strongest ∀ Π 1 b -statement over S 2 1 provable in T 2 j , similar to Con in Krajíček and Pudlák, 29) or RCon in Krajı́ček and Takeuti 107). The advantage of our notion over the others is that RCon ∗ can directly be used to construct models of T 2 j . We apply this by (...) proving preservation theorems for theories of bounded arithmetic of the following well-known kind: The ∀ Π 1 b -separation of bounded arithmetic theories S 2 i from T 2 j is equivalent to the existence of a model of S 2 i which does not have a Δ 0 b -elementary extension to a model of T 2 j . More specific, let M ⊨ Ω 1 nst denote that there is a nonstandard element c in M such that the function n ↦ 2 log c is total in M . Let BLΣ 1 b be the bounded collection schema for Σ 1 b -formulas. We obtain the following preservation results: the ∀ Π 1 b -separation of S 2 i from T 2 j is equivalent to the existence of 1. a model of S 2 i +Ω 1 nst which is 1 b -closed w.r.t. T 2 j , 2. a countable model of S 2 i + BLΣ 1 b without weak end extensions to models of T 2 j. (shrink)

Hegel and Prussianism, by T. M. Knox.--Reply, by E. F. Carritt.--Rebuttal, by T. M. Knox.--Final rejoinder, by E. F. Carritt.--Hegel rehabilitated? By S. Hook.--Hook's Hegel, by S. Avineri.--Hegel again, by Z. A. Pelczynski.--Hegel and his apologists, by S. Hook.--Hegel and nationalism, by S. Avineri.--The Hegel myth and its method, by W. Kaufmann.--For further reading (p. 172).

This essay offers a theoretical analysis of the changes which are taking place in the musical consciousness of listeners in the present phase of society. The author seeks rather to deduce the conditions of musical reception from the present stage of musical production. The first part of the article deals with changes in production as they affect the general consciousness of listeners. Light music is discussed as well as serious music insofar as it reaches the consumer. Changes in reception are (...) revealed in certain characteristics like the cult of the melody, of the voice, of the master violin, and they are tied up with specific economic concepts. Success plays a particularly important role in this connection.The second part is devoted to the retrogression in listening, analyzed psychologically. Docile passivity, imitation of pre-given patterns, and bitter resentment of the „abnormal“ have become characteristic for the listener. The author shows how this retrogression has become concretized in the formation of a „musical child’s language.“Many listeners seek to overcome passivity by a pseudo-activity. The social function of certain types like the jitter-bug, the radio amateur, or the man with a knack for jazz, are discussed.L’article entreprend d’interpréter sous forme d’une esquisse théorique les transformations qu’a subies la conscience musicale des auditeurs dans la phase actuelle de l’évolution sociale.On n’analyse pas psychologiquement les réactions des auditeurs ; mais on prend pour point de départ Tétât de la production, et de celui-ci on déduit celui de la réception.La première partie traite de la transformation de la production dans la mesure où celle-ci atteint la conscience commune des auditeurs. L’auteur considère aussi bien la musique légère que la soi-disant musique sérieuse et les modifications que connaît celle-ci pour parvenir à la consommation.Ces modifications font de la musique un fétiche. On en prend pour exemple le culte des „idées“ musicales, de la voix et des „violons de maître“. Le caractère fétiche de la musique se mesure au succès accumulé.Ensuite, on développe quelques catégories du fétichisme musical : dépravation, arrangement, „divertissement élevé“, idolâtrie de la perfection.Au fétichisme de la musique correspond du côté de l’auditeur une régression de la faculté d’entendre — phénomène qui fait l’objet de la deuxième partie de l’étude. On l’interprète comme l’attitude auditive caractéristique des „régressifs“. Soumission passive, imitation de l’antérieurement donné, fureur contre ce qui sort de la norme — définissent cette attitude, qui s’objective en un langage musical puéril en formation et dont quelques éléments sont esquissés.A cette passivité, de larges groupes d’auditeurs cherchent vainement à échapper par une pseudo-activité. Quelques types de pseudo-activité sont décrits : l’enthousiaste, le bricoleur et le „chic type“. On montre la fonction sociale de ces types.Enfin, on traite des possibilités dialectiques de l’audition du régressif. Une confrontation de l’expérience fondamentale de la musique radicalement neuve avec le mode régressif d’entendre termine l’article. (shrink)

The world appears to conscious creatures in terms of experienced sensory qualities, but science doesn't find sensory experience in that world, only physical objects and properties. I argue that the failure to locate consciousness in the world is a function of our necessarily representational relation to reality as knowers: we won't discover the terms in which reality is represented by us in the world as it appears in those terms. Qualia -- arguably a type of representational content -- will therefore (...) not be found in the physical world as characterized in experience or science. Instead, consciousness constitutes a subjective, representational reality for cognitive systems such as ourselves, and the physical world is a represented objective reality. I suggest that naturalistic approaches to explaining consciousness should acknowledge the non-objectivity of experience, and be constrained by evidence that consciousness accompanies certain sorts of behaviour-controlling representational functions carried out by complex, physically instantiated mind-systems. I evaluate a variety of current hypotheses about consciousness, and suggest that a mature science of representation may help explain why, perhaps as matter of representational necessity, experience arises as a natural but not objectively discoverable phenomenon. (shrink)

The article consists of four chapters taken from a comprehensive study on Wagner.The first chapter discusses the character of the man Wagner. The author undertakes a social analysis which reveals Wagner to be a bourgeois figure who is no longer able to fulfill the monadological claims of bourgeois society, and who actually deserts to the ruling powers while seemingly in conflict with the society of his day. This analysis is made particularly clear through a study of Wagner's anti-Semitism.The following sections, (...) only excerpts of which appear in the present essay, study the relationship between Wagner’s social character and the technical structure of his works, using concepts such as the conductor- composer and the,,gestural type“ of composition. This approach involves minute analyses of certain essential elements of Wagner's technique : the leitmotif, the infinite („unendliche“) melody, his harmonization and scoring.From the principle of Wagner's instrumentation the author derives the concept of phantasmagoria, which is the subject of the sixth chapter of the larger wrork (reprinted here). Phantasmagoria is defined as the aesthetic phenomenon that tends to hide the mode of its genesis and to appear as „nature“.The seventh and eighth chapters have not been included. They deal with the notion of the music drama as the phantasmagoric form, developed primarily from Wagner's theoretical writings, and with the mythical element in his work. The mythical in Wagner is two-sided, for it seeks to interpret the unconscious and in turn to dissolve the real into the unconscious.The two final chapters are devoted to the philosophy inherent in the works of Wagner and to a philosophical interpretation of his work. Chapter nine discusses the Ring from the standpoint of the betrayal of the revolution by the „rebel“. The canon is given by analysis of Wotan as the unity of Impotent old god and beggar. Chapter ten describes Wagner's pessimism. It shows the fundamental difference between Wagner and Schopenhauer, analyzes the Wagnerian concept of the nil as that of the chimaerical, and concludes by „rescuing“ his nihilism as the form adopted by Utopia in the early period of bourgeois decay.L'article se compose de quatre chapitres extraits d’un vaste travail consacré à Richard Wagner.Le premier chapitre étudie la personnalité de Wagner : son caractère est défini comme étant celui du bourgeois désormais incapable de répondre aux exigences monadologiques de la société bourgeoise. L’apparence d’un conflit avec la société masque la soumission de fait aux puissances établies : c’est ce qui est étudié de près dans l’analyse de l’antisémitisme wagnérien.Les chapitres suivants, desquels la présente publication n’offre que des extraits, établissent d’abord — grâce aux concepts du chef d’orchestre et du mode „gestique“ de la composition — le rapport entre le caractère social de Wagner et la complexité technique de son oeuvre. Viennent ensuite des analyses détaillées de quelques éléments essentiels du mode wagnérien de composition, tels que la technique du leitmotiv, de la mélodie infinie, de l’harmonique et de l’instrumentation.Le concept de la fantasmagorie est déduit du principe de l’instrumentation wagnérienne : voilà le thème central du sixième chapitre que notre texte présente, de nouveau, intégralement. La fantasmagorie est définie comme le phénomène esthétique qui renie le mode de sa production.Les chapitres VII et VIII encore, manquent dans la présente publication. Ils traitent du concept du drame musical en tant que forme fantasmagorique. Ce sont surtout les écrits théoriques de Wagner qui servent à développer ce concept. On en vient à examiner l’élément mythique de l’oeuvre wagnérienne — élément équivoque en ce qu’il tend à interpréter l’inconscient en même temps qu’il voudrait le dissoudre dans un inconscient plus profond encore.Les deux derniers chapitres étudient la philosophie inhérente de Wagner, et tâchent de donner une interprétation philosophique de son oeuvre. Le neuvième chapitre donne une analyse du „Ring“ — la trahison de la révolution par le „rebelle“. Le „canon“ du raisonnement est, ici, la figure de Wotan — à la fois vieux dieu rendu impuissant et mendiant. Le chapitre X décrit le pessimisme wagnérien. Il expose la différence fondamentale entre Wagner et Schopenhauer, la reconstruction méthodique du concept wagnérien du néant montre que ce néant est chimérique. La conclusion est, en quelque sorte, une réhabilitation du nihilisme wagnérien en ce que ce nihilisme fut la forme que revêtit l’utopie au début de la décadence bourgeoise. (shrink)